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The Place of Understanding
in a Phenomenology ofYou
"Language ... endures, but it endures as a continuous process ofbecoming. ''

-V. N. Volosinov

Miles Richardson
Louisiana State University

Introduction

Do you recall the other day when we met in the campus Quad? As you approached,
I put my head down to keep from greeting you roo soon. It's tricky, this business
of saying hello. Starting our ritual of mutual recognition too early and too far
apart, we will wave our hands like idiots. But ifI don't respond to your smile until
we are upon each other, you will puzzle, "Now what's going on with Miles?" If I
wait too late, and we pass, you may decide, "What the hell," cut your losses, and
leave me dangling.
Tricky business, like I say. It recalls Erving Goffman's astute observation made
some years back. After discussing at length how we theatrically present ourselves
to each other, he assured us that of course everyday life is not drama. Bur then he
went on to add chat the difference between the two is not always easy to discern
(1959).
Tricky business indeed. At times, I wonder how we accomplish our encounters
as well as we do. The structuralists among us say, "It's simple Simon semiotics."
One sign elicits another and that still another. "Good morning" gets a polite smile
and in return, a "Good morning Miles," and if I'm lucky, a slight nod in recogni
tion of my existence.
In semiotics, signs convey not their deep essences, which in any case they do
not have, but they bounce off each other in either a complementary rhythm or
in antagonistic beat, and thereby structure meaning. Signs beget signs beget signs
beget etc. Yet, following the argument of one of its progenitors, Saussure (1986),
semiotics' structuring sacrifices the richness of everyday speech, or la parole, for the
elegant purity of language, or la langue. And we, you and I, know we are robust
denizens of the planet, full of flesh and blood, and along with our mammalian kin
use our hands, our feet, our heads, and, above all perhaps, our faces to trumpet
the rhetoric of our being. 1
While not abandoning semiotics' strong suit in revealing how our lives so
often conform to words rather than the reverse, it is to phenomenology to which
we turn for a wider and deeper consideration of how we establish what ir is we
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are up to from the "simple" exchanges of "hellos" to the deepest, most heartfelt
struggle for significance. Phenomenology suggests that we work ro accomplish
our efforts through that intensive mixture of experiencing and speaking it calls
"understanding."
"Understanding" is a big, warm, cuddly word that cynics, such as you, may
not care for. On the contrary I argue that the word has in its sound the qualities
we use to find our way to each other and to the world about us. Understanding
does not act apart from experience, as a semiotician would have it, but in accord
with the senses (such as smell and sound); organs (such as the foot and the hand);
and facilities (such as the symbol) which orchestrate and are orchestrated by us,
that is, you and me.
When I get starred rolling down this track I feel the urge to pull out all stops
and in the true spirit of phenomenology let things unfold as they may. But from
past experience I know ifI do so, I will lose you and everyone else, so let me lay out
in advance the track down which we will roll (if not rock). We will (1) elucidate
the nature of understanding. We, or at least I, will (2) dare ro lodge understand
ing in the chain of life's relatedness. Then we will (3) reposition the I in the "I
and you" into the proper binary in which "you" come first, that is "you and I," or
even better, you-I. From there we will (4) scan in a hopelessly inadequate fashion
evidence for the emergence of understanding in early hominid evolution. Finally,
we, if you are still with me, will (5) end this journey with poetry.

Understanding
When we say "phenomenology, Martin Heidegger will rise-metaphorically of
course-and announce "Achtung!' Maurice Merleau-Ponry will immediately insist,
"Present." Bur Hans-Georg Gadamer, with a glance at the two, will raise his voice
in a loud, strongly accented "Here." With their intellects bright and shiny, each
clamors to be heard. But all will speak of how we, you and I, engaged one another
"pre-theorectically." Even as I say "Hi," and before you respond, "Hey Miles," we
are aware of who we are and have a good idea what each is up to, that is, between
us resides "understanding."
What some might call intuition and others, even divine insight, the three
phenomenologists above argue that understanding consists of the symbolic ma
nipulation of the body, hand, face, and voice to form an intertwined, emergent
inrersubjectiviry that goes between the you of you and the me of I. Neither solely
experience with a verbal dash nor verbal proclamations with a touch of emotion,
understanding constitutes the primary mode of communicating between us, you
and me, as members the human species.
To expand upon understanding, we can fortunately rum to a concise statement
by Thomas A. Schwandt (1999). Schwandt distinguishes understanding from
other modes of human communication through a series of contrasts, which in the
interest of specification we may number and subdivide.
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I. Knowing and Understanding
a.

To know is to engage in conscious deliberation , bur to understand takes
its meaning literally from to "stand under." Consequently to understand
is "to grasp, to hear, to get, to catch, or comprehend the meaning of
something" (4 52).

b.

In contrast to knowing which asks me, "How do you know that?" under
standing asks, "What do you make of that?" In understanding I ask, not
assert, "What's going on with you?"

c.

The quest for knowledge is che hallmark of the species, but in under
standing we are. In questing for knowledge we designate, discover, refer,
or depict, bur when we seek understanding, we disclose ourselves before
each ocher.

2. Understanding, Reading, and Learning
a.

Despite chose who argue text is a type of discourse (for example, Ricouer
1979), Schwandt considers reading as too private and coo internal co elu
cidate the qualities of understanding. Learning, on che other hand, more
clearly discloses the nature of understanding, especially if we see learning
as enactment, performance, or praxes.

b.

Citing Gadamer ( 1989), Schawndt continues co insist that understanding
is not private self-reflection. In our personal crajeccories, long before we
seek to "find" ourselves, we understand ourselves as chose who respond
to each other in an open, self-evident manner, chat is, I find you before I
discovered Miles.

c.

Continuing along chis line, Schwandt insists chat our efforts to articulate,
to pronounce, to say what we think is inseparable from our efforts co un
derstand. When I see you approaching in the quadrangle, you question
me, before either of us open our mouths. 2

3. Understanding as Relational and Existen tial
a.

Understanding is not a pre-ordained cognitive map that I apply to your
actions. Rather understanding exists between us, and since even you-who
show yourself as the absolute stranger, a person speaking in a language
foreign co me-reveal a familiar side, you and I reside in the existential
tension between the two, between che strange and the familiar, between
exile and home, between loneliness and joy.

4. Understanding at Risk
a.

A key feature in the mode of understanding is the risk of"getting it wrong."
The very possibility chat we may misunderstand what each is up to gives
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understanding its objective character. The risk challenges us to adjust our
conversations. If the risk did not haunt us, we would enter a completely
subjective mode, the mode of always being correct. But the risk of mis
understanding guarantees that we continually adjust our notions of what
.
.
1s going on.
6.

The continual adjustment comes from our mutual involvement. We have
not absolute criteria to determine our responses to one another, but that
does not mean we give up our search, saying "What the hell." Nor does
it mean that we always dazzle each other with "Congratulations!" Ir does
mean that I continually search for you and you for me, and in that search,
that restless search, we find one another-for the moment.

5. In Conclusion
a.

In sum, Schwandt insists that understanding is not an epistemology but
an existential being in the world, an ontology characteristic of humans."

To Schwandt's masterful exposition of the nature of understanding we add an
important note about presence and place. "Presence" is understanding when we
are face-to-face, eye-ball-to-eye-ball, hand-in-hand. Presence extends beyond and
deeper than "consciousness." ''Awareness" may be a near synonym. You remember
when we stood in front of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial that early spring, overcast
day? At our feet were a wreath and an infantry boot. We saw each other, you and
me, reflected in black marble, and our hands, on their own, sought a name of a
person we did not know, a name among the names, Mary T. Klinder (Richardson
and Dunton 1989). Presence does not always carry such a heightened sense, bur
whenever we meet, in rhe briefest of glances, we, you and I, are. As the Vietnam
Memorial so dramatically informs us, place is the material context in which un
derstanding resides.
The Memorial and we speak to each other. Presence surrounds us. But what
else is there, along with presence? Absence. The secret of the Memorial's sense
of presence is the appalling knowledge of absence. Mary Klinder's name is on
the wall, because she is absent. She is dead. She resides in the no-where. A place
beyond reach. 5

Life's Relatedness
Understanding, we agree, is not a thing, but a relationship. When we call out to
one another, we, you and I, exist in the calling out. The we of you and me resides
in the presence, in the now, the calling out creates.
The we is fragile it seems. Ir vanishes when the calling out between you and
me ceases. Yet, the we is hardy. Ir comes forth instantly in the next encounter of
you and me. In that encounter, in that understanding, the you of you and the I of
me are reborn in the we. We are, once again.
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Understanding in these words appears so delicate, so precious, so ephemeral,
that it is a mystery, a secret, an ineffable. Yes , it is. It is all of those, but it is also a
relationship. As a relationship it is common, a known , a spoken. It is a constituent
of our be-ing. If that is the case, it is nothing more or nothing less than a fixture
of life.
As a fixture of life, understanding lies within the net that all life forms reveal.
It is but a special characteristic of life itself Just as rhe we exists in relationship
between you and me, life exists in the interaction among life forms. From its very
beginning, life was not bounded, isolated molecules, bur it was the interaction
among them. Living systems differ from non-living ones in that information oc
cupies the central role in their maintenance and in their replication. This means
the maintenance and replication processes are less than completely random, that
is, they are capable of evolving (Rasmussen et al. 2004). The dynamics of the self
organizational material produces inheritable variations that in the presence of one
another ensure both continuity and innovation, stability and flux.
"We need to move from the molecules to an understanding of the interac
tion network in a cell" (Bishop 2002:E-79). Metazoan organisms essentially are
networks on interacting cells, and they exist in ecosystems featuring the physical
environment to be sure, bur chat environment is heavily populated by members
of the same and different species. Not only that, but the physical environment
itself changes because of the information, maintenance, and replication feedback
system, and those changes beget changes. You have only to breathe to recognize
the contribution of earlier life forms to your existence. And even as we speak, our
speaking interaction contributes to additional changes-global warming.
When we met in Quad, we, you and I, joined the live oaks, the mocking
birds, the squirrels, and the azaleas to constitute the aboveground biota linked to
the below ground community of fungi, nematodes, microarthopods, insects, and
earthworms, the belowground biota (McNeill and Winiwarter 2004). The words
exchanged between us in our greetings were but links in rhe great chain of beings
be-ing.
Communication among life forms constitutes a core fearure of life itself.
Paradoxically, individualization oflife forms, by increasing rhe separateness oflife,
challenges communication to develop attributes that will put these individuals in
contact with one another, one chat penetrates their growing individuality. Consider
vertebrates. Physically, they present a case ofdistinctive individuals that separate off
from each other through thick barriers of bone, muscle, and skin. Consequently,
communication in turn develops signals chat "increase efficiency and facilitate de
tection and recognition" (Johnstone 2202: 1059). To distinguish themselves from
background noise, (1) the signs become conspicuous; (2) rhey channel themselves
into a relatively few, stereotyped displays or sounds; (3) rhey themselves grow
redundant; and finally (4) they begin with a series of sounds, frequently loud, or
colors frequently brilliant, to alert each other that messages are on rhe way.
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We humans also employ a number of body gestures rhat consrirure part of
rhe informarional-mainrenance-replicarion sysrem by following rhe above parrern.
We also speak. Speaking also, particularly ritual discourse, sers irself the rask to ac
complish detection and recognirion, bur by being under cortical conrrol, speaking,
of course, opens up a world in which we become "you" and "I." We move inside
our words and live our dreams within rheir boundaries.

You-Me
Within rhe world of symbolic discourse, we, ro survive, musr continue to find
one another. We have compounded an already difficult task. Our interaction is
now symbolic interaction. When we speak, the materiality of words, rhe sound of
the signifier, emerges as our first "reality." "Subjectivity must be approached not
as rhe point of origin but as the effect of ... discourse" (Easthope 1983: 1983, my
emphasis). The "I" thar I claim to be emerges our of your words. When you call
"Miles?" the experiential I, so dear to my heart, comes to be as the response, "Yeah?"
The signifier "Miles?" calls forth rhe signifier "Yeah?" Clearly(!), we see each orher
"through a glass darkly." 6
When we see each other, who sees first? When we look at one another, whose
look starts our looking? The answer, I believe, is you and yours.
Johnny Weissmuller made a serious mistake when in 1932 he thumped his
chest and shouted, "Me Tarzan" and then pointed straight at Maureen O'Sullivan
and confidently announced, "You Jane." A much more accurate picture would have
him pointing breathlessly at Maureen and say, "You Jane," and then with a shuffle
of his feet and a blush on his face, whispering, "Me Tarzan."
But Johnny was in good company. Rene Descartes set himself to doubt
everything, even if he were truly doubting. At the end all of his doubting he came
ro know that the one thing he could not doubt was that he thought, therefore he
concluded, in Latin, "Cogito ergo sum," usually translared as "I think, therefore I
am." Another Frenchman, several centuries later, concluded rhat Descartes had
it backward, and so Jean-Paul Sartre lead us into exisrenrialism with, "je suis,
consequemmentjepense'' A Spaniard, Miguel de Unamuno, concurred in that behind
or within every label we could apply ro each other there stood "un hombre de carne
y hueso-a man of flesh and bone." All rhree thinkers prefaced their assertion on
an "I." It was "I" who thought, it was 'T' who claimed an existence, it was "I" who
protesred every label applied to him. Could it be that they were wrong? Could
it be rhey put the wrong person first? Could it be that the "first person singular"
pronoun should give way to the "second person singular"? If "you" came firsr, then
would "I" be rhe consequence of "your" actions? Precisely. "You are, consequently
so am I" (Figure 1).
How can I say this? On what basis can I assert thar conrrary to Johnny and
his inrellecrual betters, "You are, then I am"?

I

l
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Figure 1

u
EYE

N
E

GEN

BRAIN

YOU

HAND

.
FOOT
N
G

I (MIies)
The J. Weissmuller et al. hypothesis

u
EYE

BRAIN

N

YOU

HAND

FOOT
N
G

The M. Richardson hypothesis

Several famous investigators of the human condition have come close to the
position. Charles Cooley ( 1922) refers to you as the "looking glass self" in which in
you, I see my actions. George Herbert Mead ( 1934) all but concurs in his argument
that the meaning of a gesture lies in its response. The secret "I" chat I am can only
becomes a public Me when I rake the role of the other (i. e., you) and reflect back
upon myself. Marrin Buber argues for an even closer connection when he replaces
the "and" in "I and you" with a hyphen, that is, "I-You" to support his assertion
that one side calls forth the other (Buber 1987).
We have a specific case before us. It is your reading chat lets this text live.
Until you read what I write, the text on which I have worked with such diligence
and such conviction just lies on the paper. Ir must have your refreshing eye to live.
The "I" you see right after the "The" in this sentence depends upon your reading.
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Only in your reading, does char 'T' live (See reader response theory: Suleiman and
Crosman [1980]; as well as Deborah Tannen [1989]).
If you need additional arguments to be convinced that "You are, consequently I
am," here is one that clinches rhc case. It is your death rhar comes first. Only when
you die, do I know death. When you die, your death assures me that death is not
only a word, bur an event, a biological process, I cannot escape. I understand now
that I too will follow you. The abyss opens.

The Emergence of Understanding
The place of understanding in the ongoing exchange between you and me testifies
to its primal nature. Ir would appear to even be more fundamental than language
in the narrow sense, to be a feature that antedates verbs and nouns, and, broadly
considered, to be a feature congruent with the human condition itself
Where in the fossil record do we find the human condition? How can we infer
from paleontological record of us rhe emergence of understanding?
First, let us review rhe nature of understanding. To repeat, the guest for
knowledge is the hallmark of the species. For many of us in many situations,
knowledge controls. Through knowledge we master the world, and if the cards
fall right, each other. But in understanding we, you and I, are. Through revealing
ourselves in rhe presence of each other we gain not mastery over each other bur
the unfolding, continual mystery of you, by which I am.
Understanding, consequently, exists between us, and since even, or especially,
you, show a dark, stranger streak to your familiar face, we, you and I, reside in the
existential tension between us, between the strange and the familiar, between exile
and home, between loneliness and joy. Gadamer himself affirms in italics, "The
true locus ofhermeneutics is this in-between" (1992:295).
Given that understanding resides in our constant negotiation between the
strange and the familiar, how we locate this "sire" of constant negotiation in the
archaeological record of human be-ing? How can we recognize such a "site" amidst
rhe detritus of the past, the cast-offs, the left-overs, of centuries? Fortunately,
Wendy Ashmore, in her distinguished lecture before the Archaeological Division
of the American Anthropological Association in the fall of 2000, encourages us to
do just that, to interpret the spatial display of the archaeological record socially, to
recognize place as a component of dispositions and decisions (2002: 1172-1183).
Thus encouraged, let's proceed.
If understanding is constituent of being human, then naturally we search the re
cord for the first "humans." Humans in the broad consideration here, I would argue,
antedate Homo sapiens, Homo erectus, and even the genus Homo. We find humans
wherever we see primates who walked erect and who communicated symbolically.
This puts us roughly 2.5 millions years into the past among bipedal creatures who
transformed pebbles inro cools, collectively known as the australopithecines. Shon
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in statue, small in brain, with brow ridges, prognathic face, and big molars, they
would win no Mr. or Miss Universe pri ze, until we looked at their hands.
The hands of a variety of australopirhecines share commonalities, such as longer
and more robust thumbs that suggest control and manipulative skill comparable to
that of modern H. sapiens (Susman 1994; Panger et al 2003) . While pebble tools
are not always found in association with each of the varieties , the commonalities
suggest they engaged world with the hand .
Engaging the world with the hand implies that these creatures, small brain
notwithstanding, stood, and were transforming in the manner that authors diverse
as Karl Marx (1972) and Anthony Gibbens (1984) insist as characteristic of human
be-ing. In so doing they were not only making cools but also making the landscape
and each other. 8 As we move forward from the oldest cools at 2. 5 million years
ago co the interval between 2.0 and 1.5 million, we find not only an abundance
of pebble cools but also a distribution of them in alternative patterns of relatively
dense clusters and thin scatters. This spatial arrangement seems co indicate a social
arrangement of concentrated living/activity areas with relatively empty spaces in
between, or more directly, homes bases to which the australopithecines return again
and again (Figure 2). This interpretation, which was first put forward in the 1970s

Figure 2
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and 1980s (e.g., Quiacc and Kelso 1985), has been revisited and reinvigorated.
Lisa Rosa and Fiona Marshall ( 1996) have argued thac meat, a high quality, move
able resource, that, che early hominids secured through huncing and scavenging,
was transported repeatedly co areas associated wich water, trees, and plant food.
From there che short, bipedal hominids defended themselves cooperatively from
che large carnivores char threatened these small, relatively slow moving creatures
whose bipedality presented cheir vital organs in full view of carnivores' sweeping
paws or searing fangs.
Recurning co the same area and uniting co drive off predacors intensified che
general primate sociality. Such a home base deepened knowledge of particular in
dividuals-who ro challenge, who to avoid, and who co cuddle up with-and gave
security to young-who co run co, who to play wich, and who co run from. Such
enhanced solidarity led, perhaps inevitably, co a division between home base, the
inside zone wich ics friendship, squabbles, and sex, and the opposite, the outside
arena of insecurities, likely misfortunes, and life-threatening dangers. Consequencly,
che concentration of cools in one general place lays the foundation not only for che
experience of community in all of ics immediacy, bur by it very enhancement, the
experience of its opposite, the lack of exchange oucside, in all of its distancing.9
Lee me hasten to affirm chat the incense social exchange within the com
munity and ics absence outside, in the "not-community," is some distance from
symbol exchange of che here and of the there. To bridge between social exchange
and symbol exchange requires an account of the origin of symboling. This cask,
difficult though it may be, is at least more modest than the much larger one on
the origin of language.
My attempt follows the pach led our by Terrence Deacon's book, The Symbolic
Species: The co-evolution of language and the brain. Here, to start, come two
extraordinary quotes from chis extraordinary book: "The remarkable expansion
of the brain that took place in human evolution ... was not the cause of symbolic
language but a consequence" (340). "It is simply not possible to understand human
anatomy, human neurobiology, or human psychologywichout recognizing they have
been shaped by ... symbolic reference" (41 0; my emphases). Consequencly, to cake a
strictly evolutionary approach to symbolic communication, we must see it as part
of che adaptive radiation of humans subsequent to che ape-human split of roughly
5 million years ago. Symbolic communication differs from gescuring in chat in
gescuring che cie between the gescure and the object gescured ac is indexical-che
male peacock's display of his tail feathers indexes his overall physical stare ro the
female in quescion. 10 In symbolic communication che cie between the symbols take
precedence over che physical tie co the referent. The relation between symbols is
abstract and categorical. Saussure-like, Deacon insists chat che interplay between
symbols produces their signification. The question of the shift from exclusive
social exchange co symbol exchange is a shift from purely indexical to symbolic
commumcat1on.
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Deacon rhen advances his argument ro ricual communication. Ritual embodies
social exchange. The experiential performance of the ritual is very much part of its
power-an argument paralleling rhar of Roy Rappaport (1999). The energy among
participants as they reciprocally wheel and bow transmits rhe information portrayed
by their stylized moveme nts in such a direct, muscular fashion that words, for all
rheir ethereal elegance, cannot achieve.
In addition, Deacon points co the widely recognized power of ritual ro convey
information by reversing the message: to establish peace, act out war; ro enhance
solidarity, act out alienation; and to promote fidelity, act our betrayal.
This reversing works outs a discursive logic of
Self
Here
Us

Ocher
There
Them

And transforms rhe social exchange occurring at the home base into symbolic
exchange among early humans. The concentration of pebble tools produced by
hominids become the place, like the quadrangle, where we, you and I, encounter
one another with understanding, even before either of us speaks a word.

Journey's End
From a casual encounter in the Quadrangle, we, you and I, have elucidated under
standing, lodged it in life's fundamental relatedness, positioned you before me, and,
brashly and without class, scanned the emergence of understanding in hominid
evolution. Exhausted and uptight, I go for solace in
Poems
a Usted
and Hence

a Moi
Volosinov Poetics
"A word is territory
shared by both addresser and addressee,
by the speaker and his interlocutor."

If I say Miles, does the M stay
wirh me , and the s go to you
and rhe I to the love we said we'd share?

12
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How Is It Where
You Are?
I reach for you .
You reach for me.
We rouchWhen it doesn't rain,
and it's not too hor.
Here, in Louisiana,
rhar ain't often.

How Much Like You!
In some strange state, the other day
I heard the words of a Cuban bolero.

Siempre que te pregunto
que cudndo, c6mo, y donde,
tu siempre me respondes
quizds, quizds, quizds.
"Always when I ask you,
When? How? Where?
Always you respond,
Perhaps. Perhaps. Perhaps."

The Pair Tree
In life's backyard,
plarned by circumstance,
a lone tree with a single leaf
and on rhat stem, one fruit.
A green You lobed, wirh veins
branching shaping a claw.
A red Me filled, with skin
bursting, voicing a cry.

Crazy Miles
Fighting the simulacra
he planned to blow holes
in the classroom walls
so they could have real windows.
In the end, they led him away,
but not unkindly.
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Notes
1. Forgive me, bur I cannot lee these words srand wirhout honoring my debt to el hom
bre de came y hueso himself, Miguel de Unamuno, and his lifelong "agony" to comprehend
himself as a creature of flesh and bone and as speaker of the sanctifying word (1974)
2. Do we say what we think, or do we chink what we say? Growing up as countryboy
in Ease Texas, I was more non-verbal than verbal. So English teachers drove me up the wall
wirh rheir "Proper speaking reveals a thoughtful mind." To this day, I remain suspicious
of "proper speaking."
3. For earlier but srill pertinent exposirions, see Bucrimer (1976) and Seamon (1980).
In his presentation of us as inhabiting the world as interpretative beings, Schwandt quotes
Kerderman (1998) "The existential tension between 'home' and 'exile' at once distinguishes
our human siruarion and ... makes undersranding [that situation] possible." I have re
cently attempted to expand on that tension between being-in-place and being-out-of-place
(2003).
4. In a broader treatment, Schwandt succinctly sums up the mauer, "Understanding
is participative, conversational, and dialogic" (2000: 195; my emphasis).
5. In his critical work on scructuration in which he stresses rhe "essentially rransforma
tive character of all human action," Giddens refers to locations as providing rhe physical
setting for human action but perhaps even more importantly they offer the contextualiry
necessary for the rransformative to occur. As we see here, locations are places whose settings
offer the contextualry for us to understand (always hesitantly) where we are, who we are,
and what are we up to (1984: 119).
6. The paragraph irself appears darkly, and I apologize. At this stage in this text,
I have to relay on your familiariry with Ferdinand de Saussure (1986 [1966]), Jacques
Derrida (1976; 1978), and Anthony Easthope (1983), which, with the possible exception
of Easrhope, I know you possess.
7. In rhe older terminology, Hominidae (humans) contrasted with Pongidae (rhe
three grear apes). Because of the molecular evidence that shows chimpanzee more closely
related to humans than either co the gorilla, one version of the newer terminology based
on molecular comparisons places both chimps and humans in Hominidae, with subfamily
distinction, Homininae, for humans. Having norhing against chimps, but because of the
profound morphological and the behavior differences between the two, I stick with the
older classification, with hominid being any primate rhat walks up righr, and human any
bipedal primate that communicates wirh symbols. Presently, four fossil genera antedate rhe
ausrralopirhecines. From youngest to oldest, these are Kenyapirhecus (3.5 MY), Orrorin
(6 MY), Ardipirhecus (4.4-5.8 MY), and Sahelanrhropus (7 MY). Discussion continues
concerning their bipedal status.
8. ln contrast to those who mighr suggest char the makers produced Oldowan tools by
more or less randomly pounding one pebble against another, Semaw er al. (1994) argue char
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knappers of the Gana, Ethiopia tools-the oldest on record-knew what they were doing.
The large number of well-struck flakes with conspicuous bulbs of percussion indicated a
clear understanding of facture mechanics. ln addition the knappers preferred uachyte to
other material for its better flaking properties.
9. Such an interplay immediately brings to mind Derrida's intertwining of presence
and absence, with presence being but absence deferred and absence being but presence
deferred ( 1973), or in general, the play of discursive logic, by which symbols, whose very
presence, standing for objects not there, makes absence possible.
10. Just for fun, lee me mention a case of experimental male plumage enhancement
among barn swallows. The scientists, diabolically of course, darkened the ventral feathers
of selected males already maced with females and found chat the manipulated males were
the preferred object of choice of females not only among che original females but among
others as well. Those males without enhancement lost out, chat is, they have fewer offspring
(Safran et al. 200 5).
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